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	<title>Chinese Negotiation &#187; Negotiating tactic</title>
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	<description>Negotiate in China more effectively and successfully</description>
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		<title>Negotiating Chinese Partnerships – Are you a long term partner or a short term resource?</title>
		<link>http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2010/07/negotiating-chinese-partnerships-%e2%80%93-are-you-a-long-term-partner-or-a-short-term-resource/</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 20 Jul 2010 16:33:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Hupert</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Americans Negotiating in China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China Negotiating & Recession]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China Negotiating Trends]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Know Your Counter-Party]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tactics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Balance of Power]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[chinese negotiating behavior]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chinese partnership]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Negotiating tactic]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recession]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[Chinese negotiators often see the foreign partnership as a short-term tactic on the way to the real long-term goal of independent global competitiveness.  ]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Western companies in China feel that the deck is stacked against them.  Between rising labor costs, indigenous innovation requirements and slowing global demand, it has never been harder to make profit on the Mainland.  Even the deep-pocketed China-fans like GE and Siemens are publicly complaining about the operating environment.   The stock answer to China’s business challenges used to be finding a local partner who could open doors and bring a little local love. Unfortunately for newcomers and old-hands alike, Western partners in China JVs &#038; tie-ups are reporting their own tales of woe – from pinched technology to crimped sales.  More and more Chinese firms are telling their Western partners that the marriage is over.</p>
<p><em>Aren’t Chinese businesses supposed to be long term planners?</em></p>
<p>Yes, and that’s the problem.  As many Western deal-makers are finding out, Chinese negotiators often see the foreign partnership as a short-term tactic on the way to the real long-term goal of independent global competitiveness.  </p>
<p>Chinese firms are pragmatic.  They acknowledge the need for Western technology and methodology, but that no longer means a permanent marriage.    Since the financial crisis of 2007, Western firms have lost the brass ring that used to keep the Chinese side of the partnership in line – access to US and European markets.  The cold hard fact is that Western firms are entering partnership negotiations with a hand that is not strong and growing weaker.  The Chinese market is becoming the new El Dorado (though it may end up being just as mythical) and the technology gap is definitely growing narrower.  </p>
<p>Chinese firms are increasingly viewing Western firms as a short-term partner, a medium-term customer or client and a long-term competitor.  Operating a JV in China was tough enough before the crash in the US &#038; Europe and China’s new ‘indigenous innovation’ policy came into force – but many international managers in China now see a bleak future.<br />
Here are a few useful tactics for negotiating a long term relationship in China:</p>
<ol>
<strong>1.	Plan first, negotiate after.</strong><br />
Don’t shy away from asking yourself hard questions about your basic plans for China.  Do you really need a long term partner in China?  Why?  What’s the relative balance of power going to be through the life of your partnership?  Are you looking for a perpetual subordinate – because your Chinese counter-party might not be interested in a permanent secondary role.  As you and he both learn more about the business what’s the natural competitive environment going to evolve into?  Not only do you have to plan for 2015 – you have to discuss those plans with the Chinese side.  If you plan on calling the shots in China ad infinitum, then you would be wise to make that clear BEFORE you share your IP and trade secrets. </p>
<p><strong>2.	Structure is everything in China.</strong><br />
Forget about NDAs and contracts.  The deal that makes sense is the deal you’ll end up with.  If you plan on having a long term relationship, structure accordingly.  If you are providing design and capital and he is providing market entry advice and distribution then you have to plan for a point 18 months from now when he has your designs and you have access to distribution channels.  What are you basing JV 2.0 on?   A Chinese partner who thinks he can do better without you is going to find a way out of the relationship, even if it means scuttling the business and starting over on his own after you have gone back home.  If the only thing you have in your corner is a signed contract, then you are embarking on a lose-lose relationship.  </p>
<p><strong>3.	Consider a sunset clause. </strong><br />
Your best relationship may be a short one with an option for some type of longer-term arrangement.  Teenagers think that passion leads to happy-ever-after, but adults are supposed to know that compatibility is based on other things.  Still &#8211; there’s nothing wrong with a quick hook-up if everyone knows that’s all there is.  But don’t propose if all you want is dinner and a movie.  No matter what your plan, always have a viable exit strategy.</p>
<p><strong>4.	Don’t pay today for what may or may not come tomorrow. </strong><br />
Cynical Chinese negotiators learned long ago that naïve Americans believe in the fantasy of ‘long-term guanxi’ and are more than happy to let you pay up-front for the relationship of your dreams.  Their dream is being the sole patriarch of a family dynasty.  You aren’t in their dream. </p>
<p><strong>5.	Use your words. </strong><br />
If you have thought it through and decided that a long-term relationship is what you want, then make that part of your negotiation from the beginning.  Be explicit and open.  This is exactly the kind of thing you should be talking about during those relationship-building activities &#038; banquets.  Don’t just stop with the easy platitudes about harmony and working together.  Likewise, don’t hold your breath waiting for the Chinese side to come up with a comprehensive game plan.  It’s up to you to come up with specifics that include benchmarks and a structure that keeps both sides satisfied.</ol>
<p>Partnership hint:  Long-term JVs in China are more threatened by success than failure.  It’s relatively easy to pull together when disaster is at hand and everyone needs one another.  It’s when the Chinese side comes to believe (rightly or wrongly) that you have outlived your usefulness that partnerships fall apart.  Plan for the good times as well as the bad.<br />
==============</p>
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		<title>Monday morning quarterback:  The Yuan float.</title>
		<link>http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2010/06/monday-morning-quarterback-the-yuan-float/</link>
		<comments>http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2010/06/monday-morning-quarterback-the-yuan-float/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 Jun 2010 00:01:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Hupert</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Americans Negotiating in China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China Negotiating & Recession]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Know Your Counter-Party]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Negotiating in China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tactics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[chinese negotiating behavior]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[yuan]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Western commentators are once again connecting unnumbered Chinese dots to form the picture that they want to see. ]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>No one wants  to throw cold water on the warm, glowing embers of global harmony &#8211; and it is certain that my insights into where the RMB-USD will trade in a year are no clearer than anyone else’s&#8230;  But let’s all catch our breath for a moment and look objectively at what is happening in the run-up to this week’s G20 meet  in Toronto.</p>
<ol>
<li>Western commentators are once again connecting unnumbered Chinese dots to form the picture that they want to see.  The <a title="PBOC statement on Yuan flexibiity" href="http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-49454320100619">PBOC statement on Yuan flexibility</a> says nothing about timing, direction &#8211;  or anything of substance having to do with the new RMB currency regime.  It may be the harbinger of a new Grand International Coalition, or it may be Orwellian doublespeak justifying anything Beijing wants to do.</li>
<li>The west is expected to take forex off the table forevermore in exchange for a vague non-promise of flexibility.  How does this change the situation on the ground?  Western financial leaders have once again been pressed into service against their own Main Streets.  If the rmb appreciates by less than 10% over the next year, Geithner &amp; Co are going to look a lot like Jack trading the cow for magic beans.</li>
<li>The Chinese side is controlling not only the substance of the argument, but also the timing and the scope. This is classic Chinese negotiation tactics.</li>
</ol>
<p>Still, the chundits (China pundits) and globalists are thanking Beijing and congratulating themselves for averting a crisis.  Well, it’s certainly nice to think so.  But as we prep for the Toronto G20, how does this announcement change the negotiating environment?</p>
<p>First, China gets to maintain the status quo until it sees fit to change.   Even more significantly, the global recovery debate has been shifted away from artificial exchange rates and structural trade imbalances to western debt levels (which are still very much on the G20 table).  China once again trades smoke and mirrors for concrete western concessions.</p>
<p>This time, however, Beijing may be outsmarting itself.  This is the second doublespeak manifesto to come out in 2 weeks – following close on the heels of the <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-06/08/c_13339232.htm">Internet White Paper  released on June 8</a>.  Beijing is displaying a new tendency to spell out in black and white just how gray and subjective its standards are.  Chinese tacticians have always exalted &#8216;formlessness&#8217; and misdirection, but after a while it becomes possible to benchmark deception.  A pattern is emerging &#8211; Beijing enacts a policy (the currency peg or the Great Firewall), calmly waits for international debate to die down, and then finally releases an official definition of terms.  These pronouncements are <em>fait accompli</em> that protect China’s complete range of motion &#8211; but are couched in legalistic terms that sound objective.</p>
<p>In the bad old days when capitalism was the enemy and secrecy the rule, China-watchers used to count  coal cars on trains heading into Beijing to gauge the level of economic activity.  With this new set of documents &#8212; the Internet Manifesto and the Yuan de-peg paper &#8212; we have a new metric by which we can understand Beijing’s true intent.  This time, however, we will be judging the hardness of the NO by the conviction with which we’re told MAYBE SOMEDAY.</p>
<p>==============</p>
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		<title>Chinese Tactics:  The Balance of Power</title>
		<link>http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2010/05/chinese-tactics-the-balance-of-power/</link>
		<comments>http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2010/05/chinese-tactics-the-balance-of-power/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 28 May 2010 01:36:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Hupert</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Americans Negotiating in China]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[BATNA]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[When the power shifts in a Chinese relationship, you’d better know it.
 
 
Introducing, the Balance of Power Shift, or BOPS.
Part I:  What’s the Balance of Power Shift?
 Part II:  BOPS and tactics.
 Part III:  BOPS and counter-tactics
In every Chinese deal a little power must shift.  There will come a time [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<ol><em>When the power shifts in a Chinese relationship, you’d better know it.</em></ol>
<p><em> </em></p>
<p><em> </em></p>
<p><strong>Introducing, the Balance of Power Shift, or <em>BOPS</em>.</strong></p>
<blockquote><p>Part I:  What’s the Balance of Power Shift?<br />
<a title="Chinese Tactics Post BOPS" href="http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2010/06/us-china-negotiation-tactics-and-the-balance-of-power-shifts-bops-part-ii-how-it-affects-chinese-tactics/"> Part II:  BOPS and tactics.</a><br />
<a href="http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2010/06/negotiating-in…ering-the-bops/"> Part III:  BOPS and counter-tactics</a></p></blockquote>
<p>In every Chinese deal a little power must shift.  There will come a time when the prospective supplier who was kissing your assets yesterday starts acting surly and aloof.  Or that busy, cell phone guy suddenly has all the time in the world for you.  What’s going on –<a href="http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2009/08/americans-negotiating-in-china-fear-the-bops/"> Balance of Power Shift.  BOPS</a>.</p>
<p>Chinese deals can have a lot of them, but they almost always have at least one.  This is when the Westerner suddenly outlives his usefulness – or the Chinese realizes that the Lai Wai can do this just fine on his own from now on.  One way or another your partner feels that the relative power of the relationship has changed, and now it’s your problem.  The first rule is that you can’t ‘opt-out’ of the pettier and dumber aspects of the culture just because you think they are petty and dumb.  Your Chinese counter-party has a propensity to get fussy about power games and deep strategy.  And because it is part of their world, now it is part of your world.  Got that?</p>
<p><strong>Post-BOPS behavior patterns:</strong><br />
Behaviors change rapidly, and experienced negotiators know what the new signals mean.  You should too.</p>
<p>After the Western side wires the funds, one of three things will happen.</p>
<ul> •One is that everything stays 100% on track as both sides worry about execution and expansion in a balanced, systematic and logical manner.   It usually doesn’t.<br />
•	Sometimes the Chinese will feel that they have been dealt a losing hand.  Either it looks like they will make less money or that you will make more than optimistic estimates led them to believe. This is where the quality problems, the unfinished projects and the unanswered phone calls are born.<br />
•	The third option is that the Chinese side feels it has the advantage.  That’s when you have outlived your usefulness.  This is the signal for the start of some potentially aggressive behavior, like the kind of IP theft where they start running a competing business with your plan, product &amp; designs.</ul>
<p><strong>China Deal BOP:  Which way is it moving?</strong></p>
<p>What triggers a power shift?<br />
The BOPS – the Balance of Power Shift.  It can be caused by something external to the negotiation or something internal – but suddenly your Chinese counterpart feels either stronger or weaker than he did yesterday – relative to YOU.</p>
<ol> • Maybe you moved money into the partnership – in which case you are weaker.  Maybe you signed a deal with a different Chinese firm – in which case you are stronger.   If you are making more &#8211; or he is making less &#8211;  it may be causing resentment which can force a BOPS earlier.<br />
• You are supposed to be the brawn, they are the brains.  Even though your brawn was cash, technology, designs and know-how – they were the brains of China.  Each day the balance is shifting.  As you transfer more money, know-how, training and IP to the circle, their power grows.  As you learn more about China &amp; the industry and build up your network, your power grows.<br />
• In China, your success can suddenly trigger a BOPS against you – as your Chinese counter-parties decide that you are exploiting them and that they should A) charge more and B) find other deals that don’t include you.</ol>
<p><strong>Why does it occur?</strong><br />
They either think you were screwing them (your fault or not) or think they can do better by screwing you.   Either way, it’s a decision – not a rule – and it’s governed by the Chinese notion that there is always another opportunity just around the corner. Another factor is that Chinese negotiators consider education about your operation and industry to be an intangible but valuable asset.  The knowledge they’ve gained is part of their payout.  It usually declines steeply.  By the time they have the upfront money, they are done.</p>
<p>In other words, your cooperative structure may be eroding at the base even as it looks the most successful.  While you are building and struggling, your Chinese counter-party remains loyal because he is still putting the pieces together.  But once you have succeeded with your first order or preliminary operation, then your usefulness as a teacher is exhausted.  They have learned it all, and can probably do better on their own in China than in helping YOU prop up your fat margins.</p>
<p>There are a lot of factors contributing to the BOPS, but it seems to be closely connected to how low-maintenance the relationship is, and what the earnings potential looks like.  If the payout is level or falling, look for the Chinese side to decide that the grass is greener and the BATNA higher on the other side.  At that point, you need them a lot more than they need you – hence the BOPS.</p>
<p><strong>Time &amp; Risk</strong><br />
Westerners believe that the safest course of action is to secure a stable base of operations and grow from there.  The Chinese feel that the smart businessman acts quickly when an opportunity appears – and is always ready to move on to the next one.  Both sides, pursuing a risk-reduction strategy,  will undermine the partnership.  It is important to put aside your own preconceptions about what constitutes long term benefit, best practices and common sense.</p>
<p><em><a title="Chinese Tactics Post BOPS" href="http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2010/06/us-china-negotiation-tactics-and-the-balance-of-power-shifts-bops-part-ii-how-it-affects-chinese-tactics/">Next:  BOPS II &#8211; How it affects tactic</a></em><em>s</em></p>
<p>==============</p>
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		<title>A Stakeholder Analysis of Chinese Negotiation</title>
		<link>http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2010/01/a-stakeholder-analysis-of-chinese-negotiation/</link>
		<comments>http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2010/01/a-stakeholder-analysis-of-chinese-negotiation/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Jan 2010 14:08:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Hupert</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Americans Negotiating in China]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[China negotiating]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[Americans of a certain age still default to a negotiating model based on shareholder analysis.  We like to know who the owner is.  For us, the power structure of our counter-party is defined with a simple phrase:  “Follow the money”.
Younger MBAs, Europeans and Asians prefer a stakeholder perspective.   Stakeholders include [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Americans of a certain age still default to a negotiating model based on shareholder analysis.  We like to know who the owner is.  For us, the power structure of our counter-party is defined with a simple phrase:  “Follow the money”.</p>
<p>Younger MBAs, Europeans and Asians prefer a stakeholder perspective.   Stakeholders include everyone and anyone who can affect a decision – or be affected by it.  It’s softer, messier, and much, much more complex.  </p>
<p>In Chinese deal-making following the money just won’t work.  Too much is hidden, unspoken, contextual and driven by non-economic factors.  In many cases, you’ll never see the money trail because it may be irrelevant, hidden, non-existent – or may start AFTER you have transferred your funds.  If you plan on negotiating successfully in China, you’d best start mastering the messy art of stakeholder analysis.</p>
<p>A stakeholder model is more applicable in China than in the US, but some American&#8217;s are still blundering around vainly searching for the key decision maker.  In China dense, opaque organizational structures have evolved to make sure that this kind of tactic is unsuccessful.  Overly aggressive Americans often find themselves negotiating with people claiming to be the true decision-maker – while the real power is hidden far away.  </p>
<p><strong>Mapping Chinese Stakeholders</strong><br />
A simple but powerful mapping technique for understanding stakeholder influence in Chinese negotiation is to set POWER along a horizontal X axis and ENGAGEMENT along the vertical Y axis.    This is particularly useful in China, where your counter-parties may intentionally obscure or misrepresent the decision-making process.  </p>
<p>Power is simple enough.   In a deal-making context, half the ‘power’ story can be understood as the ability to make things happen.  In a highly bureaucratic environment like China, regulatory approval often translates into power.  The central bureaucracy is the stakeholder of last resort, and very little of significance can occur without the government’s knowledge and approval.</p>
<p><strong>The power of negative thinking.  </strong><br />
In China, the other side of the coin is Negative Power &#8211; the ability to STOP things from happening. Often the most potent negotiators are the ones that have the power to block, slow or alter the course of regulatory approval.  Chinese negotiations are characterized by <a href="http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2008/10/5-chinese-negotiating-styles/ ">AVOIDANCE tactics </a>to a degree unmatched in the US.    Saying YES is often far more politically sensitive and riskier than saying NOT At This Time.  The more frustrated you become with the delays, the more reluctant the counter-party is to take on the risk of approving your request.</p>
<p><strong>Engagement is a big deal in China. </strong><br />
Often overlooked by American negotiators in China, discovering the true decision makers – and then getting them to participate in the process – is a huge challenge.  If you are dealing with a purely commercial counter-party and negotiating about standard deal-terms like price, timetables and quality, you may find that you are only addressing half of the real issue.  American negotiators in China have to devote time, energy and bandwidth to uncover the entire deal-making process and identify all of the stakeholders who need to buy in.  If you are ignoring the bureaucracy until the last minute, you will find that your position is incredibly weak in the second, REAL negotiation.  </p>
<p><em><strong>3 Classes of Stakeholders in China.</strong></em></p>
<p><strong>Government bureaucracy.</strong><br />
This is the stakeholder of last resort.  They are always there but rarely visible.  </p>
<p>In general, the bureaucracy occupies the High-Power, Low-Engagement quadrant.  <a href="http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/category/americans-negotiating-in-china/ ">Chinese bureaucrats are Avoiders</a><br />
simply because so much of the power structure is stacked in their favor that they have very little to gain from direct involvement.  One of the toughest negotiations in China is just identifying who the real decision makers are and how you can exert influence.  </p>
<p>Bureaucratic avoidance is as potent as it is unfamiliar to most Americans who are accustomed to head-on horse-trade type negotiations.  Pressure tactics are almost always counter-productive with Chinese bureaucrats.  This is why so many Americans end up with signed contracts that can’t be executed – or worse, are executed poorly or partially.  </p>
<p>Bureaucrats tend to avoid direct negotiation with foreigners.  You&#8217;ll see these guys in their office or ministry, and the conversation is largely confined to paperwork and red tape.  All of the high level wheeling-dealing takes place somewhere else &#8211; with someone else.  Unless your Mandarin is excellent and you have already built up a great deal of credibility with the government, you probably won&#8217;t ever meet with one of these people on your own.  You may however find yourself in a banquet or board room situation, but all of the serious stuff will happen in much more discreet settings.  To negotiate with the Chinese bureaucracy, you will need someone with the right connections.</p>
<p><strong>Connectors-</strong><br />
The second class of Chinese stakeholder includes consultants, partners, suppliers or service providers who negotiate on your behalf with the bureaucracy.  Sometimes you hire these people directly and sometimes they are your counter-party who is responsible for regulatory approval.</p>
<p>These guys are highly engaged &#8212; in many cases they are actively looking for you.  What you have to determine is A) their true level of power and B) whether they are a positive or negative force for you.  </p>
<p>Connectors manage the relationship with the bureaucracy &#8212; and they almost always do a much better job than you could.  The good news is that the right partner or agent can easily accomplish things that you never could.   The bad news is that they&#8217;ve attained and maintained these relationships due to their utility to bureaucrats &#8212; not to the client.  Often their real negotiation centers on strengthening their relationship with important officials – using your resources as currency.  </p>
<p>Remember – in China many officials are given quotas and policy goals that run counter to your own.   Many of those Westerner’s who lost their shirts in China due to misunderstandings, regulatory delays or failed approvals were really just cases of unsuspecting westerners trusting the wrong partner and ending up someone else’s guanxi payment.</p>
<p><strong>Outsiders.  </strong><br />
Foreigners, technical experts and multinationals make up this group.  Highly engaged but usually fairly low power.  The good news is that they can&#8217;t make bad things happen.  The bad news is that they can&#8217;t make good things happen &#8212; except for special situations.  Those situations include goal-setting, research, knowledge, staffing and due diligence &#8212; so this crew has definite uses.    These guys are reliable in terms of safeguarding your IP and will have the most usable analysis of Chinese economic &#038; market conditions.  Their utility is that the bureaucracy has relatively little influence over them, so they   will be loyal to your interests.  Good for knowledge, niches and specific transactions, these outsiders rarely have the ability to complete a deal cycle.  </p>
<p>Outside experts are most useful early in the process before you have made the catastrophic mistakes that are so common to this region.</p>
<p><strong>Know what you need and who can deliver.</strong><br />
You&#8217;ll probably have to deal with all three in one form or another.  Just makes sure that you know who is who.  The bureaucrats are easiest to spot &#8212; they are unambiguously official.  Connectors bridge the divide between you and the bureaucracy – but you have to have very clear goals and understand the lay of the land to make the right choices and ask for the right variables at the right price.   Your process should begin with honest, competent research, planning and selection of the right connectors &#038; counter-parties – which almost always requires a reliable outsider.</p>
<p>The danger for Westerners is in trusting a connector who is working against your interests.  This is a leading cause of problems in China – and the best preventative is to locate loyal outsiders who can help you set appropriate goals and know how to perform due-diligence on the agents and counter-parties you will need to be successful in China.  Many Americans in China end up relying on their highly competitive supplier or partner to negotiate on their behalf with the bureaucracy.  It’s a huge mistake.</p>
<p><em>Outside consultants first, then motivated connectors and finally the bureaucrats.  If you can find the right people in the right sequence, then you might stand a chance of negotiating successful in China.</em></p>
<p>===========</p>
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		<title>Smart-or-Honest is a Bad Choice in Chinese Negotiations</title>
		<link>http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2009/08/smart-or-honest-is-a-bad-choice-in-chinese-negotiations/</link>
		<comments>http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2009/08/smart-or-honest-is-a-bad-choice-in-chinese-negotiations/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2009 01:09:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Hupert</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Americans Negotiating in China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Negotiating in China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[business entry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China deals]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China negotiating]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chinese counterparty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[chinese negotiating behavior]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cultural difference]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[negotiating style]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Negotiating tactic]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-China negotiation]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2009/08/smart-or-honest-is-a-bad-choice-in-chinese-negotiations/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Americans negotiating in China must take care to avoid making a local counter-party choose between common sense and honesty.   This is a bad idea anywhere in the world, but it is worth emphasizing here because so many American and European negotiators in China maneuver themselves into just that position.   
Sometimes Westerners [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Americans negotiating in China must take care to avoid making a local counter-party choose between common sense and honesty.   This is a bad idea anywhere in the world, but it is worth emphasizing here because so many American and European negotiators in China maneuver themselves into just that position.   </p>
<p>Sometimes Westerners are so eager to ‘do the deal’ that they blur the line between cooperative partner and profit-seeking competitor.  Chinese negotiations are famously social &#038; cultural in nature – there are dinners, singing, girls, drinking and long discussions about the importance of trust and mutual cooperation.  Many newcomers to Chinese business internalize their desire for a ‘guanxi’ to the point that they start to confuse their business relationship with friendship.  Either through misjudgment or oversight, they put valuable assets in the hands of their local partners and then get on a plane back to NY or London.  The Chinese party now finds himself with a huge incentive to harm the overseas party – and little in the way of control or oversight to prevent it.    </p>
<p>Here are a few red-flags to be aware of when finalizing deals in Mainland China that indicate you are blurring the line between friendly competitor and loyal partner.  </p>
<ol>
<strong>• Starting work without a legally binding contract or actionable agreement. </strong><br />
This is particularly relevant to service providers and consultants planning on getting paid by the Chinese counter-party – or anyone who has to transfer funds to get a deal started.  As we’ll see, the problem isn’t that a contract in China offers you all that much protection, but that novice Westerners are too quick to assume that you have achieved a ‘meeting of the minds’ about costs and procedures.  Many, many Western consultants have ended up working for free after they thought they had achieved a ‘verbal understanding’.  Be particularly sensitive to situations where your local counter-party tells you that you have a deal, but the person who signs/stamps the documents is unavailable.  </p>
<p><strong>• Making your local counter-party your only source of information.</strong><br />
It is easier than ever to get information and data about the China market, yet many over-scheduled Westerners still end up relying on a local partner for 99% of their China business knowledge.  Yes, it’s easy.  No, it’s not what ‘everybody does’.  Respecting the opinion and expertise of your local partner, supplier or employee is a great idea, but it’s not enough.  If you don’t have the time to monitor your China business then you don&#8217;t have the time to do business in China.  In 1995 it was very hard to get business news on China.  Now we are swimming in it.</p>
<p><strong>• Leaving your counter-party as sole controller of valuable assets &#8212; including but not limited to your intellectual property, trademarks and product designs.</strong><br />
Invest the money and time in a few hours with a competent international lawyer and find out what you should be protecting.  Otherwise intelligent, pragmatic Westerners tend to be incredibly naïve and optimistic when it comes to trademarks, website names, patents and product designs in China.  A US-registered trademark doesn’t necessarily mean anything in China.  You need to understand your rights and obligations BEFORE you let your Chinese counter-party understand the potential value in this new market.  No one likes spending money on lawyers and accountants – but it is much cheaper to do it early then wait until after a problem arises.</p>
<p><strong>• Lack of due diligence, reference checks or legal/accounting support.</strong><br />
Westerners often ignore the most important type of China network – their own professional service providers.  If you are doing business in China, you need a legal guy, a finance guy and possibly a consultant guy.  These may be professional experts on retainer or part of informal network &#8211; but you need access to independent, informed decisions. You need to a network of experienced Old Hands to use as sounding boards. Going to your negotiating counter-party for legal and financial opinions makes even less sense in Shanghai than it does in NY.</p>
<p><strong>• Relying solely on contracts and written agreements that can’t be readily enforced.  </strong><br />
Contracts are vital everywhere but they function a bit differently here in China.  In the US contracts tend to be conclusions and serve to finalize business agreements.  In China, contracts often function as the starting point for the REAL final decision.  That doesn’t undercut their usefulness, however.  A contract articulates the agreement and demonstrates a meeting-of-the-minds at the time of signing – which is all very useful.  But a Westerner angrily waving a piece of paper in the face of a Chinese counter-party has become the familiar emblem of a failed deal.  Chinese courts are rarely good remedies for Western business people.   </ol>
<p>Chinese have a reputation among Americans as being less honest &#8211; and it very well may be deserved.  But Americans have a reputation among Chinese as being less sharp &#8211; and that may very well be deserved as well.  </p>
<p>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<br />
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		<title>American Negotiating in China &#8212; Doing Chinese Deals on One Foot</title>
		<link>http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2009/08/american-negotiating-in-china-doing-chinese-deals-on-one-foot/</link>
		<comments>http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2009/08/american-negotiating-in-china-doing-chinese-deals-on-one-foot/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2009 05:53:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Hupert</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Americans Negotiating in China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tactics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BATNA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China negotiating]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[chinese negotiating behavior]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Negotiating tactic]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-China negotiation]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2009/08/american-negotiating-in-china-doing-chinese-deals-on-one-foot/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[When doing business in China, American negotiators already know that they have to be ready to walk away from the table &#8212; but just make sure you do it right.
Chinese negotiators are expert at manipulating American counter-parties with deadly combinations of tactics that will have you scratching your head all through the fight back to [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When doing business in China, American negotiators already know that they have to be ready to walk away from the table &#8212; but just make sure you do it right.</p>
<p>Chinese negotiators are expert at manipulating American counter-parties with deadly combinations of tactics that will have you scratching your head all through the fight back to the US.  One particularly effective set of maneuvers used by Chinese negotiators is to start with an opening offer that is several times the price that they actually expect to receive from a knowledgeable counter-party.  They follow with a very reasonable, “well what were you thinking of paying?”  The Chinese side will then rapidly – and quite humbly – allow you to ‘beat them down’ to a price only 200% over the reasonable market level.    I’ve seen Americans accept terrible deals – but leave the table convinced that they’ve out-dealt the Chinese side because they were able to cut the initial offer in half.  </p>
<p>A real danger for Americans negotiating in China is that you may get drawn into an emotional haggling match instead of a considered business negotiation.  You’ve probably read the standard negotiating literature about focusing on ‘interests – not positions’ and this is exactly what they are talking about.  If your negotiations with the Chinese get emotional or heated then you have already lost.  Keep your cool throughout the entire deal cycle – from making first contact with a potential partner all the way through to the end of the negotiation.   Be careful to have a clear bottom-line, and stick to.  </p>
<p>If you decide that there is no point in continuing the discussion, then you have to walk away.  But like everything else in Chinese negotiating, there is a right way to do it.</p>
<ol>
1) <strong>Don’t get emotional. </strong> Smile.  Breathe.  Relax.  Stay friendly, cordial, polite – but most of all, professional.  Its just business.  Your goal is to move on to the next meeting – not to ‘teach them a lesson’ or get in a final zinger. </p>
<p>2) <strong>Thank them.</strong>  This tends to put the Chinese off-balance.  “I appreciate your honesty and frankness.  Even though we can’t do business this time, I’ve certainly learned a lot from the experience.  Thank you.”   </p>
<p>3) <strong> Acknowledge the Chinese side’s position – and then some.</strong>  I like to say something along the lines of, “clearly your offer is honest and considered, but your product or service is far beyond my needs and expectations.  If this is a fair offer on your part then we aren’t talking about the same type of material/product/service.  But I hope that we can try again if my situation changes in the future.”</p>
<p>4) <strong>Now it’s time to walk away – but do it slowly. </strong>  There’s an excellent chance that they will come back with a much more reasonable offer.  I call this part, “doing business on one foot” because you are in the process of walking away – albeit in slow motion. </p>
<p>5) <strong>DO NOT COME BACK TO THE TABLE UNLESS THE OFFER IS SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED. </strong> The one-foot approach only works once, and if you just pick up where you left off the previous negotiation then you have squandered your advantage.</ol>
<p>As in all negotiations in China, your chances of success are vastly improved if you have researched market conditions thoroughly, decided on a clear walk-away point, and have a wide range of potential counter-parties waiting in the wings.  Be warned though – all of your preparations count for nothing if you lose your head and allow your China negotiations to become an emotionally-charged haggling session.</p>
<p><em>Next:  Who should make the first offer – the Chinese or American Negotiator?  </em></p>
<p>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<br />
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		<title>Americans Negotiating in China  &#8212; Fear the BOPS.</title>
		<link>http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2009/08/americans-negotiating-in-china-fear-the-bops/</link>
		<comments>http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2009/08/americans-negotiating-in-china-fear-the-bops/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 11 Aug 2009 02:58:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Hupert</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Americans Negotiating in China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Negotiating in China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Balance of Power]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BATNA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Negotiating tactic]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-China negotiation]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Balance of Power Shifts.  Bops, re-bops – You ain’t gonna like this tune.   
Business disagreements in China often follow this pattern:  You meet a charming, friendly, engaged Chinese business-person, and begin to craft your Win-Win deal.  Things progress smoothly through the preliminary phases, and both sides are cooperative and cordial [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em><strong>Balance of Power Shifts. </strong> Bops, re-bops – You ain’t gonna like this tune.  </em> </p>
<p>Business disagreements in China often follow this pattern:  You meet a charming, friendly, engaged Chinese business-person, and begin to craft your Win-Win deal.  Things progress smoothly through the preliminary phases, and both sides are cooperative and cordial enough to come up with a written agreement very quickly.  There seems to be a real bond of trust here.  The American side agrees to transfer funds and technical specifications immediately, and a date is set for the delivery or completion of the project.  This is, in reality, the day that negotiations REALLY begin in earnest – and it’s likely the American will get much less than he bargained for.</p>
<p>This example can be broken down into 3 distinct phases.  </p>
<ol>
<strong>Phase 1.  Courtship.  </strong><br />
The <strong>Balance of Power </strong> (BOP) favors American side.  Chinese side is cordial, flattering, Win-Win, compromising.  American side feels confident, in control, optimistic about expanding business ties in China.  “Why does everyone say this is so hard?”</p>
<p><strong>Phase 2.  Assets transferred.</strong><br />
Moments after the American side transfers an investment, up-front payment, deposit, good-faith money and/or IP &#038; tech specs, the BOP suddenly shifts to the Chinese side.  Their need for the American side has dropped SIGNIFICANTLY now that the money and technology is in China– and the foreigners have already gone back to their oversized American homes and giant gas-guzzling SUVs.   The Chinese side starts dealing with the American side on a more even, informal basis (a good thing) but may become less responsive and communicative (a bad thing).  The American side may not sense that a shift in the power balance has already taken place.  These  relationships are still intact – but will vary in terms of productivity.</p>
<p><strong>Phase 3.  Deal concluded.</strong><br />
The Chinese side has delivered, and the deal is done.  &#8220;Xie Xie ni, wai pengyou – don’t let the door hit your butt.  Here&#8217;s the container, the building, the project &#8212; or the story.  We&#8217;re all done now.&#8221; For many Americans in China, this is when the REAL negotiation begins.  It’s only after the deal is supposed to be completed that the American side finds how little communication/compliance there actually was.  The American side wants to re-engage and persuade the Chinese side to execute the agreement the way they said they would.  But now something strange happens.  The Chinese side may simply ignore their former partners.  This ‘avoider’ strategy is very well respected among China’s commercial set, and if you are unlucky you will find out just how good they can be at it.  The power shift is complete, and you no longer have access to the decision-makers that you need to negotiate a settlement. </ol>
<p><em>Three vital lessons for Americans doing deals in China: </em> </p>
<ol>
1. Watch the timing of the negotiation, because the Chinese side is much, much more patient than you are.</p>
<p>2. Structure your deals so that funding and asset transfers reinforce your position &#8212; not undermine it.</p>
<p>3. Face time is vital.  You have to be in it to win it?  Maybe.  But how about a more China-oriented version:  You have to show up to follow up.  If you &#8211; or someone who represents you (and your counter-party is NOT that guy) isn&#8217;t around to make sure that the spirit of your agreement is respected, then you will certainly end up with less than you thought you bargained for.</ol>
<p>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<br />
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		<title>China Negotiation Tactic:  Pelosi as Bad Cop?</title>
		<link>http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2008/11/china-negotiation-tactic-pelosi-as-bad-cop/</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 05 Nov 2008 23:58:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Hupert</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[tactics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Negotiating tactic]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[For years – maybe centuries – Chinese negotiators have turned weakness into strength by confounding outsiders with their inscrutable, Byzantine bureaucracy and terrifying brutal rulers.   Well, now that there is a change of administration after 8 long years, US negotiators can finally turn the tables a bit.  ‘Those Democrats – scary bunch.  Trade restrictions.  New [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For years – maybe centuries – Chinese negotiators have turned weakness into strength by confounding outsiders with their inscrutable, Byzantine bureaucracy and terrifying brutal rulers.   Well, now that there is a change of administration after 8 long years, US negotiators can finally turn the tables a bit.  ‘<em>Those Democrats – scary bunch.  Trade restrictions.  New quality inspections.  Human rights certifications.  Lots of new regulations, new restrictions, new penalties.  We had better do this deal NOW, or I can’t tell you what the new terms will be…</em>’ </p>
<p>In addition to the ticking bomb tactic, you and also play this as <em>Good Cop – Bad Cop</em>.  The only thing you have to remember is that you can’t use Obama as Bad Cop – everyone loves him.  No, in China the most terrifying specter you can summon is definitely  Pelosi.  She’s got it all.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Terrifying</strong>.  Oh, yeah.    </li>
<li><strong>Powerful.</strong>   She controls the Democratic Congress – with a Democrat in the White House.</li>
<li><strong>Mysterious</strong>.   Chinese people barely know who she is or what her job is …yet.</li>
<li><strong>Capricious</strong>.  Unpredictable.  Never know what will set her off or what she’ll care about.</li>
<li><strong>Vindictive</strong>.  She is not a China fan.  Do a Google search on <em>Pelosi, China.</em></li>
</ul>
<p>Chinese men are not afraid of tough men.  The worse that can happen is death.  Chinese men <em>are </em>terrified of tough women.  They can make you wish for death – for a very long time.  (This is more true of Shanghai than anywhere else.)</p>
<p><em>HINT:</em>  If you do try this, play the ‘<strong>capricious</strong>’ and ‘<strong>mysterious</strong>’ cards heavily.  Chinese negotiators tend to see the US negotiating landscape as more stable and transparent then their own.  Any uncertainty you can introduce will weaken their position.</p>
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